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Abstract 
 
The two most important problems identified in a post-financial crisis look back are perverse incentives 
and de-linking of financial sector growth and activities with the real sector of the economy. These 
problems are inherently avoided by Islamic banks. In this study, we take 7 year data from 2007 to 2013 
for all 5 full-fledged Islamic banks. We attempt to empirically explore the determinants of liquidity risk in 
Islamic banks. As per the findings, deposits to total capital ratio increases the liquidity risk. It is plausible 
since greater deposit mobilization implies greater liabilities of banks. The increase in this ratio implies 
that a greater portion of funds with banks are in the form of deposit liabilities as compared to own 
capital. We also find that increase in capital to financing ratio decreases the liquidity risk which is again 
consistent with apriori expectations. The results further highlight that improvement in efficiency also 
reduces the liquidity risk by freeing tied up resources. Finally, the increase in spread increases liquidity 
risk since there is a tradeoff between increasing spread and credit risk. Higher spreads improve 
profitability, but they narrow the scale of operations due to which finance to deposit ratio decreases. For 
Islamic banks, it is true that finance to deposit ratio and spread move in opposite directions. 
 
Keywords: Islamic Banking, Islamic Finance, Interest Free Banking, Risk Management, Credit Risk, 
Liquidity Risk 
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 and ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe has challenged the 
conventional wisdom. Massive levels of debt and consumption beyond means and speedy financial 
innovation with lax regulation has put major economies in a deep crisis.  
 
According to The Economist, in the US, the share of total corporate profits generated in the financial 
sector grew from 10% in the early 1980s to 40% in 2006. These earnings are transaction costs for the 
production sector. Financial institutions that were just supposed to be playing a supportive role to the 
production economy grew much bigger and unregulated through the shadow banking practices. 
 
Recently, Piketty (2014) explains that the tendency of returns on capital to exceed the rate of economic 
growth today threatens to generate extreme inequalities. Nevertheless, financial intermediation has a 
useful function to facilitate intertemporal consumption decisions by households and investment decisions 
by firms to encourage capital formation. It is well established in literature that financial development 
compliments economic growth. Levine (2002) using cross country data argues that overall financial 
development is robustly linked with economic growth. North (1990) and Neal (1990) have also concluded 
that regions that developed the relatively more sophisticated and well-functioning financial systems were 
the ones that were the subsequent leaders in economic development of their times. Odedokun (1998) also 
concludes that the growth of financial aggregates in real terms has positive impacts on economic growth 
of developing countries, irrespective of the level of economic development attained. 
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 What is needed is a new paradigm that can put the focus back on productive enterprise, brings recovery 
with job creation, limit and regulate speculative financial instruments and improve corporate governance 
by influencing the incentives more deeply and proactively. 
 
During the last decade and half, the Islamic financial industry has seen tremendous growth even when the 
conventional financial institutions went into a deep crisis. Islamic finance is a fast growing industry all 
across the globe with an asset base touching $1.5 trillion in a small amount of time. Islamic finance 
products are not only interest free alternatives for the financial needs of the contemporary Muslim 
communities wanting to avoid interest, but the products are generating increased appeal primarily because 
of their financial and economic merits. Islamic finance principles by basing all financial products with 
real assets provide an inherent risk management tool inbuilt into the system. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: 
 
In section 2, we discuss the operational underpinnings of risk management in Islamic banking. In section 
3, we give an overview of Islamic banking in Pakistan and document the performance using various 
descriptive statistics and present our analysis. In section 4, we give a brief account of empirical literature 
focused on risk determinants in Islamic banking. In section 5, we explain our research methodology, 
results and findings.  
 
2. Risk management in Islamic Banking   
 
The basic structure of Islamic banking can be explained as follows. First, an Islamic bank creates an asset 
pool which consists of bank‟s equity and deposits. Deposits include two further classifications, i.e. 
remunerative deposits and non-remunerative deposits. Remunerative deposits are mobilized using 
partnership mode „Mudarabah‟ with bank‟s shareholders and depositors as partners. Profit sharing ratio is 
agreed at the start of this partnership. Non-remunerative deposits are mobilized using Qarz (non-
compensatory loan). 
  
This pool of assets is used to provide asset backed financing. These financing assets are based on different 
underlying financing contracts, i.e. Ijarah, Diminishing Musharakah, Murabaha, Istisna etc. Islamic bank 
does not lend money. It provides asset backed financing in which the asset is owned by the bank. These 
financing modes can be categorized as lease based financing or credit sale based financing.  Income 
stream is generated either through profit on credit sale or rent for the use of asset. 
  
Income from the sale or lease of real assets is distributed among the contributors in asset pool, including 
bank‟s shareholders and depositors. To achieve spreads for financial intermediation function, profit 
sharing is done between bank and depositors as per the pre-agreed profit sharing ratio. 
 
In this section, we discuss the major risks that Islamic banks face in their commercial operations and the 
tools with which they mitigate these risks.  
 
2.1. Credit Risk  
  
Credit risk is generally defined as the potential that the counterparty fails to meet its obligations in 
accordance with agreed terms. Credit risk includes the risk arising in the settlement and clearing of 
transactions. 
  
But, since clean borrowing is not possible in Islamic banking, Islamic financing is asset backed and 
adequately collateralized. Furthermore, the title of ownership rests with the bank in Ijarah and Murabaha 
until the actual sale transaction is made. Therefore, an Islamic bank can foreclose the asset in the case of 
default.  
  
2.1.1. Tools to Manage Credit Risks  
   
- Pledge of Assets as Collateral 
 
Any asset owned by the client could be taken as collateral. The client may not be able to sell that asset 
without bank‟s permission. However, the ownership of the asset will remain with the client.  
 
- Third Party Guarantee 
 
If the client‟s own guarantee is not completely reliable, then the bank can ask for third party guarantee, 
especially when the client is an associated company or a subsidiary company or when the majority owner 
is a conglomerate.  
 
- First and Second Charge on Assets 
 
First and second charge on the asset rank the order in which the proceeds of the liquidated asset are used 
to pay off liabilities. If a financier has a secondary charge, then his turn to be paid back from the client‟s 
liquidation of asset will come second. All else equal, the financiers will prefer to have first charge.  
 
- Takaful 
 
Takaful can be used to insure a tangible movable or immovable asset. The insurance cost can also be 
added back in the sale price or rentals.  
 
- Hamish Jiddiyah  
 
As an alternative to down payment or security deposit, some advance rental could be taken which may be 
adjusted in the payment schedule. It could also be used as partial settlement price for the sale of asset. 
However, any amount received in this case at the beginning of the contract cannot be taken as income for 
that period.  
 
2.2. Market Risk  
  
It refers to the risk arising from adverse movements in interest rates, commodity prices and FX rates. 
Commodity risk is also present in Murabaha, Ijarah and Salam. 
  
2.2.1. Tools to Manage Market Risks  
   
- Parallel Contract (if permissible) 
 
To mitigate the storage risk and avoid inventory cost, parallel contract can be done for the same date in 
the case of Salam.    
 
- Binding Promise 
 
Binding promise which is unilateral (one-sided) can be taken to ensure contract enforcement and to 
guarantee seriousness of purpose on client‟s end before the bank invests depositors‟ funds to provide 
financing to the clients.  
 - Takaful for Asset Risk 
 
Takaful can be used to insure a tangible movable or immovable asset. The insurance cost can also be 
added back in the sale price or rentals.  
 
2.3. Equity Risk  
  
It refers to adverse changes in market value (and liquidity) of equity held for investment purposes. It 
covers all equity instruments including Mudarabah and Musharakah.  
  
2.3.1. Tools to Manage Equity Risks  
   
- Seek diversification of capital contribution. 
- Using restricted Mudarabah. 
- Using Musharakah than Mudarabah where possible. 
- Limiting period of contract. 
- Plan exit strategies. 
 
2.4. Liquidity Risk  
  
Liquidity risk is the potential loss to the Islamic banks arising from their inability to meet their obligations 
as they fall due without incurring unacceptable costs or losses.  
  
2.4.1. Tools to Manage Liquidity Risks  
   
- Diversify Sources of Funds 
 
Increase in non-remunerative deposits can reduce the cost of raising funds from the public. Reliance on 
few big deposits is risky. It is better to have a widespread deposit base.  
 
- Reduce Concentration of Funding Base 
 
It is better to have efficient liability mix with adequate availability of short term and long term deposits. 
Maturity matching on both sides of the balance sheet can solve much of the problem systematically.   
 
- Rely on Marketable Assets 
 
It is better to finance those assets on priority basis that have secondary market and that are somewhat 
standardized and widely used in the real sector of the economy.  
 
2.5. Legal Risk  
  
It refers to inadequate legal framework, conflict of conventional and Islamic laws and conflict between 
Shariah rulings and legal decisions.  
  
2.5.1. Tools to Manage Legal Risks  
   
- Taking prior approval from Shari‟ah advisor. 
- Documenting agreements to make them enforceable. 
- Binding undertakings. 
- Covering contingencies in design of agreements. 
- Documenting the details of rights/duties in agreements. 
- Strong internal compliance, due diligence and audit. 
 
2.6. Displaced Commercial Risk  
   
It refers to the risk that the Islamic bank may confront commercial pressure to pay returns that exceed the 
rate that has been earned on its assets.   
  
2.6.1. Tools to Manage Legal Risks 
 
- Floating rentals so that increase in benchmark rate is absorbed effectively on both sides of the 
balance sheet. 
- Using profit equalization reserves. 
- Using Hibah. 
 
Hence, it can be seen that asset backed financing feature in Islamic banking ensures sound credit risk 
management. The different modes of Islamic financing cater to different needs of the client and help the 
Islamic bank to ensure effective risk management. The use of floating rentals helps the Islamic bank to 
mitigate benchmark rate risk. We also discussed that Islamic banks use profit equalization reserves to 
remain competitive and reduce the commercial displacement risk.     
  
3. Islamic Banking in Pakistan 
 
In Pakistan, the second phase of Islamic banking got started in 2002 with the launch of first full-fledged 
Islamic bank in Pakistan, i.e. Meezan Bank. The first phase of Islamic banking during the 1980s under the 
patronage of Zia-ul-Haq was not successful. However, with increased participation of Shari‟ah scholars in 
the policy making, product design, audit and supervision, the second phase has seen impressive and 
consistent growth.  
 
Now, Islamic banking in Pakistan is an established industry with 10% market share achieved in just over 
a decade. There are 5 full-fledged Islamic banks and 18 other commercial banks that operate Islamic 
banking windows alongside conventional banking operations in Pakistan. 
 
Figure 1 below shows the growth in assets, deposits and advances in Islamic banking industry in Pakistan 
for the period 2006-14. The exponential and uninterrupted growth is evident from this graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Islamic Banking Growth in Pakistan 
 
Source: SBP Islamic Banking Bulletin 
 
Figure 2 below shows the profitability in Islamic banking during the period 2006-14 in Pakistan as 
measured by the accounting ratio, Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). It can be seen 
that initially some banks took time to consolidate and reach breakeven; but in later periods, they have 
registered strong growth with ROE reaching even 18% and sustaining to be in double digits despite the 
security, energy and fiscal crisis in the country. 
 
Figure 2: Profitability in Islamic Banking in Pakistan 
 
Source: SBP Islamic Banking Bulletin 
 
However, the challenge for Islamic banks in Pakistan is to effectively use the deposits in generating 
income earning assets. It can be seen in Figure 3 below that the gap between Deposits to Total Assets 
(DEP to TA) and Financing to Total Assets (FIN to TA) had swelled in recent quarters in Pakistan. It 
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shows that deposit mobilization had been much easier in Islamic banking as compared to using the 
deposits to provide finance. This widening gap is after the consumer financing credit crunch and can 
partly be explained by increased intensity of energy crisis which hit the manufacturing sector the most in 
Pakistan. Islamic banks with assets backed financial products rely much more on formal documented 
manufacturing based industries where finance is required for plant and machinery, raw material and 
industrial equipment.  
 
Figure 3: Deposit to Total Assets vs. Finance to Total Assets 
 
Source: SBP Islamic Banking Bulletin 
 
4. Brief Review of Empirical Literature on Risk Determinants in Islamic Banks 
 
In this section, we give a brief account of empirical literature on risk determinants in Islamic banking. In 
early literature, How et al (2004) using Malaysian data find that Islamic banks have significantly lower 
credit and liquidity risks but significantly higher interest-rate risk than conventional banks. They also find 
that bank size is significantly related to credit risk. Their results show that loan volatility, bank capital, 
and bank size are statistically significantly related to liquidity risk. 
 
Conducting a study in Malaysia, Noraini (2012) finds that the financial crisis has little impact on the 
extent of liquidity risk in the Islamic banks. The study also suggests that there is a general decline in the 
ROE of the Islamic banks from 2006 to 2008, indicating that the crisis has had an adverse effect on the 
Islamic banks‟ profitability. Conducting a study for Islamic banks in Malaysia, Misman et al (2013) show 
that financing quality, capital buffer and Islamic financing type have a positive and significant effect on 
credit risk of Islamic banks in Malaysia while capital ratio and financing expansion are negatively related 
to their credit risk level. 
 
For a study on credit risk determinants in GCC Islamic banks, Al-Wesabi & Ahmad (2013) find that the 
credit risk is largely determined by liquidity, management quality, risky assets in portfolios and GDP. 
 
Conducting a study for Pakistan, Ahmed et al (2011) use credit, operational and liquidity risks as 
dependent variables while size, leverage, NPL ratio, capital adequacy and asset management are used as 
explanatory variables. The results indicate that the size of Islamic banks have a positive and statistically 
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significant relationship with financial risks (credit and liquidity risk), whereas its relation with operational 
risk is found to be negative and insignificant. The asset management establishes a positive and significant 
relationship with liquidity and operational risk. The debt equity ratio and NPL ratio have a negative and 
significant relationship with liquidity and operational risk. In addition, capital adequacy has a negative 
and significant relationship with credit and operational risk. 
 
In another study for Pakistan, Iqbal (2012) reports significant and positive relation of CAR, ROA, ROE 
and size of the bank with the liquidity risk, whereas NPL is negatively related with liquidity risk. In a 
cross country study of 99 full-fledged Islamic banks from top 14 Islamic banking countries, Alam (2012) 
uses 10 year data for the period 2000-10.  According to the empirical findings, Islamic banks are more 
profit efficient compared to the cost efficiency scores. Inefficient Islamic banks still maintain lower risk 
level due to cost constraints which restricts the ability of inefficient Islamic banks to take on more risks.  
 
5. Research Methodology 
 
5.1. Data 
 
We have selected five full-fledged Islamic banks in the sample. Annual data for the period 2007-13 on 
various internal financial factors is taken from the balance sheets and income statements. We have also 
created variables from the reported data which are important financial ratios used commonly for the 
analysis of banks. In total, there are 35 observations (N = i x t), i.e. 7 year data (t) for 5 banks (i) and thus 
we have a balanced panel. Islamic banks included in the sample are Meezan Bank Limited (MBL), Bank 
Islami (BI), Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB), Bank Al-Barakah (BA) and Burj Islamic Bank (BIB). Variables 
are taken from the annual reported financial statements. Some variables are constructed as ratios of 
reported variables. Table 1 lists variables and defines their mathematical definition. 
 
Table 1: List of Variables with Labels and Mathematical Definition 
 
Variable Label Formula 
dep Total deposits dep 
fin Total financings fin 
cash_t Cash at treasury cash_t 
cash_b Cash at bank cash_b 
totcash  Total cash as sum of cash in treasury and cash with banks cash_t +  cash_b 
liquidity Ratio of total cash to total deposits totcash/dep 
findep  Ratio of finance to deposits fin/dep 
spread_r  Ratio of gross return to gross expense ret_g/ exp_g 
efficiency Ratio of gross return to administrative expense ret_g/admin_e 
nplfin  Ratio of NPL to total finance npl/fin 
depcap  Ratio of deposits to total capital dep/cap 
lnassets  Natural log of assets ln(assets) 
spread  Difference of gross return to finance and gross expense to 
deposits 
(ret_g/fin)-(exp_g/dep) 
 
5.2. Methods of Analysis 
 
We use balanced panel data and estimate the model using fixed effects and random effects. We also apply 
several diagnostic tests to check for heteroeskedasticity and serial correlation. We use Hausman test to 
decide between choosing fixed effects and random effects model. We also give illustrations of important 
ratios of individual banks.     
 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
It can be seen that finance to deposit ratio is on the lower side for most Islamic banks. Most Islamic banks 
have also reached breakeven and have positive ROE in recent years. Apart from Bank Al-Barakah, most 
Islamic banks have seen decline in liquidity recently. The spread calculated as the ratio of gross returns to 
gross expense is fairly steady across all banks. It implies that size has limited influence on profit potential.  
Efficiency as measured by the ratio of gross returns to administration expense of most Islamic banks was 
higher during the credit crunch, but lately, there is a decline in the ratio. Lastly, NPLs rose during the 
credit crisis, but have stabilized since 2009.   
 
Figure 5: Key Ratios for Islamic Banks 
 
  
Figure 5.1: Finance to Deposit Ratio Figure 5.2: ROE 
.4
.6
.8
1
1
.2
1
.4
fi
n
d
e
p
0 2 4 6 8
t
MBL BI
DIB BA
BIB
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
ro
e
0 2 4 6 8
t
MBL BI
DIB BA
BIB
  
Figure 5.3: Total Cash / Deposits Figure 5.4: Gross Return to Gross Expense 
  
Figure 5.5: Gross Return to Admin Expense Figure 5.6: NPL to Finance 
 
5.4. Empirical Determinants of Liquidity Risks 
 
Next, we describe our model to study the determinants of liquidity risks. 
 
illiquidityit   = β0 + β1depcap + β2cfr + β3efficiency + β4lnassets + β5spread + eit  ……… (i) 
 
Where 
 
illiquidity = Ratio of total deposits to total cash. 
depcap  = Ratio of total deposits to total capital 
cfr   = Ratio of capital to total financing. 
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efficiency = Ratio of gross return to administrative expense 
lnassets  = Natural log of total assets. 
spread   = Ratio of NPL to total financing 
eit   = Random error term. 
 
„i‟ is cross sectional unit identifier and „t‟ is time identifier. 
 
We run the model using fixed effects and random effects estimation framework. As per Hausman test, we 
find that fixed effects model is more efficient. The dependent variable „illiquidity‟ is defined as ratio of 
deposits to total cash. Increase in this ratio implies greater liquidity risks since each unit of cash at bank 
has greater deposits as liabilities with a higher value of this ratio. As per the empirical findings, deposits 
to total capital ratio increases the liquidity risks. It is plausible since greater deposit mobilization implies 
greater liabilities for banks. The increase in this ratio implies that a greater portion of funds with banks 
are in the form of deposit liabilities as compared to own capital. We also find that increase in capital to 
financing ratio decreases the liquidity risk which is again consistent with apriori expectations. The results 
further highlight that improvement in efficiency also reduces the liquidity risk by freeing tied up 
resources. Finally, the increase in spread increases liquidity risk since there is a tradeoff between 
increasing spread and credit risk. Higher spreads improve profitability, but they narrow the scale of 
operations due to which finance to deposit ratio decreases. For Islamic banks, it is true that finance to 
deposit ratio and spread move in opposite directions during the period of this study.  
 
Table 2: Model Estimation for Islamic Banks 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, we discussed that asset backed financing in Islamic banking ensures sound credit risk 
management. The different modes of Islamic financing cater to different needs of the client and help the 
Islamic bank to ensure effective risk management. The use of floating rentals helps the Islamic bank to 
mitigate benchmark rate risk. We also discussed that Islamic banks use profit equalization reserves to 
remain competitive and reduce the commercial displacement risk. In the empirical part of the study, we 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(4, 25) =     6.55               Prob > F = 0.0009
                                                                              
         rho    .74674365   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.9008651
     sigma_u    3.2640507
                                                                              
       _cons     48.89428   15.24207     3.21   0.004     17.50265    80.28591
      spread     30.05068   14.22963     2.11   0.045     .7442127    59.35714
    lnassets    -3.778785   1.470403    -2.57   0.017    -6.807138   -.7504326
  efficiency    -1.698225   .8541761    -1.99   0.058    -3.457433     .060984
         cfr    -.1505614   .0369948    -4.07   0.000    -.2267536   -.0743691
      depcap     .5202289   .1683519     3.09   0.005     .1735016    .8669561
                                                                              
 illiquidity        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8136                        Prob > F           =    0.0002
                                                F(5,25)            =      7.54
       overall = 0.2755                                        max =         7
       between = 0.2272                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.6014                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         5
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        35
find that deposits to total capital ratio increases the liquidity risk since greater deposit mobilization 
implies greater liabilities of banks. We also find that increase in capital to financing ratio decreases the 
liquidity risk which is again consistent with apriori expectations. The results further highlight that 
improvement in efficiency also reduces the liquidity risk by freeing tied up resources. Finally, the 
increase in spread increases liquidity risk since there is a tradeoff between increasing spread and credit 
risk. Higher spreads improve profitability, but they narrow the scale of operations due to which finance to 
deposit ratio decreases. For Islamic banks, it is true that finance to deposit ratio and spread move in 
opposite directions. 
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